On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games

  title={On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games},
  author={John C. Harsanyi},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={179 - 196}
  • J. Harsanyi
  • Published 1 June 1961
  • Economics
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
The purpose of this paper is to re-state and re-examine the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games. It is also proposed to discuss T.C. Schelling’s recent criticism of some game-theoretical postulates, in particular the symmetry postulate [15, 16]. 
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