On the psychology of prediction

  title={On the psychology of prediction},
  author={D. Kahneman and A. Tversky},
  journal={Psychological Review},
In this paper, we explore the rules that determine intuitive predictions and judgments of confidence and contrast these rules to the normative principles of statistical prediction. Two classes of prediction are discussed: category prediction and numerical prediction. In a categorical case, the prediction is given in nominal form, for example, the winner in an election, the diagnosis of a patient, or a person's future occupation. In a numerical case, the prediction is given in numerical form… Expand

Figures and Tables from this paper

Frequency, Probability, and Prediction: Easy Solutions to Cognitive Illusions?
It is found that frequency-based predictions are different from-but no better than-case-specific judgments of probability, while results from studies of overconfidence in general knowledge and base rate neglect in categorical prediction underline a general conclusion. Expand
The psychology of moderate prediction: II. Leniency and uncertainty
Abstract In this paper we demonstrate that intuitive numerical predictions can be somewhat regressive. This moderation of predictions is asymmetric: predictions are more regressive at low than atExpand
R 1 2 A Model of Heuristic Judgment
The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability ofExpand
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases: Biases in judgments reveal some heuristics of thinking under uncertainty
Publisher Summary Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future value of the dollar.Expand
Heuristics and Biases: Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning
Uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of the human condition. Many significant choices must be based on beliefs about the likelihood of such uncertain events as the guilt of a defendant, the result ofExpand
Causal Thinking in Judgment under Uncertainty
Many of the decisions we make, in trivial as well as in crucial matters, depend on the apparent likelihood of events such as the keeping of a promise, the success of an enterprise, or the response toExpand
Heuristics and Biases: When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism
One of the most robust findings in the psychology of prediction is that people's predictions tend to be optimistically biased. By a number of metrics and across a variety of domains, people have beenExpand
A Model for the Interpretation of Verbal Predictions
  • A. Zimmer
  • Computer Science
  • Int. J. Man Mach. Stud.
  • 1984
Abstract There is a marked gap between the demands on forecasting and the results that numerical forecasting techniques usually can provide. It is suggested that this gap can be closed by theExpand
The role of causality in judgment under uncertainty.
Four experiments show that when a clear mapping can be established from given statistics to the parameters of an intuitive causal model, people are more likely to use the statistics appropriately, and that when the classical and causalBayesian norms differ in their prescriptions, people's judgments are more consistent with causal Bayesian norms. Expand
Coherence and correspondence in the psychological analysis of numerical predictions: How error-prone heuristics are replaced by ecologically valid heuristics
Numerical predictions are of central interest for both coherence-based approaches to judgment and decisions --- the Heuristic and Biases (HB) program in particular --- and to correspondence-basedExpand


Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness
This paper explores a heuristic — representativeness — according to which the subjective probability of an event, or a sample, is determined by the degree to which it: (i) is similar in essentialExpand
“Suppose you have run an experiment on 20 subjects, and have obtained a significant result which confirms your theory ( z = 2.23, p If you feel that the probability is somewhere around .85, you mayExpand
Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment.
This work examines the models that have been developed for describing and prescribing the use of information in decision making, the major experimental paradigms, and the major empirical results and conclusions of these two approaches. Expand
Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
A judgmental heuristic in which a person evaluates the frequency of classes or the probability of events by availability, i.e., by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind, is explored. Expand
Regression effect in psychophysical judgment
Psychophysical judgment, like all other kinds of judgment, involves a matching or equating of two different domains. When the judgment involves the mate hing of values on two perceptual continua, theExpand
Predicting with intuitive correlations
An experiment in the context of man as intuitive statistician tested ability to produce an intuitive equivalent of simple linear-regression predictions as a function of the correlation between twoExpand
Psychology and psychiatry have grown up in relative isolation from each other. Medicine, “the mother of the sciences,” was less intimately connected with the birth and early life of psychology thanExpand
Reforms as Experiments
The United States and other modern nations should be ready for an experimental approach to social reform, an approach in which we try out new programs designed to cure specific social problems, inExpand
Man as an intiutive statistician: On erroneous intuitions concerning the description and prediction of events. Unpublished master's thesis (in Hebrew), The Hebrew University
  • Man as an intiutive statistician: On erroneous intuitions concerning the description and prediction of events. Unpublished master's thesis (in Hebrew), The Hebrew University
  • 1972