On the private provision of public goods

  title={On the private provision of public goods},
  author={Theodore C. Bergstrom and Lawrence Edward Blume and Hal R. Varian},
  journal={Journal of Public Economics},
Abstract We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the equilibrium provision of the public good. We are able to characterize the properties and the… Expand
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