Corpus ID: 73656454

On the number of licenses under symmetric versus asymmetric information with signaling

@inproceedings{Antelo2014OnTN,
  title={On the number of licenses under symmetric versus asymmetric information with signaling},
  author={Manel Antelo and Antonio Sampayo},
  year={2014}
}
We analyze a two-period licensing game in which a non-producer upstream patent holder licenses an innovation to either one or two downstream licensees for a payment based on the licensee’s expected per-period profit. Licensees have private information about the innovation’s value, and their period-1 output may signal that value. We find that two licensees are more likely to be preferred under asymmetric information with signalling than under symmetric information. 
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TLDR
A research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology will sometimes sell two licences, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive licence. Expand
The licensing of patents under asymmetric information
Abstract This paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information. The licensee is assumed to know theExpand
Duration and payment of licensing contracts for users to reveal what they know
Non-producing patent holders usually have to license their innovations to users capable of marketing them and usually ignore their market value. This article is aimed at analysing the dynamics ofExpand
Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard
An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There are situations in which more licenses are sold if effort is a hidden action. MoralExpand
Chapter 11 Patent licensing
Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on the patent licensing. Game-theoretic methods have made it possible to address questions with regard to patent licensing. The common modes of patent licensingExpand