• Corpus ID: 73656454

On the number of licenses under symmetric versus asymmetric information with signaling

@inproceedings{Antelo2014OnTN,
  title={On the number of licenses under symmetric versus asymmetric information with signaling},
  author={Manel Antelo and Antonio Sampayo},
  year={2014}
}
We analyze a two-period licensing game in which a non-producer upstream patent holder licenses an innovation to either one or two downstream licensees for a payment based on the licensee’s expected per-period profit. Licensees have private information about the innovation’s value, and their period-1 output may signal that value. We find that two licensees are more likely to be preferred under asymmetric information with signalling than under symmetric information. 

On the Number of Licenses with Signalling

This work analyzes a two-period licensing game in which a non-producing upstream patent holder licenses an innovation that lasts for two periods to either one or two downstream users and finds that the patent holder is more likely to grant two licenses under signalling than under symmetric information.

Duration and payment of licensing contracts for users to reveal what they know

Non-producing patent holders usually have to license their innovations to users capable of marketing them and usually ignore their market value. This article is aimed at analysing the dynamics of

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