On the moral and legal status of abortion.

  title={On the moral and legal status of abortion.},
  author={Mary Anne Warren},
  journal={The Monist},
  volume={57 1},
1 We will be concerned with both the moral status of abortion, which for our purposes we may define as the act that a woman performs in voluntarily terminating, or allowing another person to terminate, her pregnancy, and the legal status that is appropriate for this act. I will argue that, while it is not possible to produce a satisfactory defense of a woman’s right to obtain an abortion without showing that a fetus is not a human being, in the morally relevant sense of that term, we ought not… 

Drawing a line on the moral and legal permissibility of abortion.

Induced abortion continues to be a subject of ethical and moral debates, with the hope that reaching an agreement on what is deemed morally permissible will guide how the society ought to respond by

The Moral Rights of the Embryo

The question concerning the moral rights of the embryo is, indeed, the question of its moral status. If it has any moral rights they should be firmly protected. If it has not, then it seems there is

Abortion and Argument by Analogy

Abstract The purpose of this essay is to examine the consistency and coherence of some arguments about abortion. Theological, philosophical, and public policy discussions of abortion are linked by

Abortion and The Concept Of A Person

  • J. English
  • Philosophy
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy
  • 1975
This paper concludes that no single criterion can capture the concept of a person and no sharp line can be drawn and it is argued that if a fetus is a person, abortion is still justifiable in many cases; and if aetus is not a people, killing it is still wrong in many Cases.

Self-Ownership and Abortion

This paper argues that in the absence of general duties to rescue a woman may, at any time, terminate an unintended pregnancy even if the foetus is a person. However the rights of the foetus restrict

A dualist analysis of abortion: personhood and the concept of self qua experiential subject

  • K. Himma
  • Philosophy
    Journal of Medical Ethics
  • 2005
It is argued that, under dualist assumptions about the nature of mind, the fetus is not a person until brain activity has begun, and that a dualist can take the position that abortion ought to be legally permitted at least until the beginning of brain activity in the fetus.

The Economic Efficiency and Equity of Abortion

  • T. Meeks
  • Political Science
    Economics and Philosophy
  • 1990
The author critically examines a 1971 article by Judith Jarvis Thomson concerning fetal personhood and the maternal right to privacy and asserts that the efficiency of different output allocations and even output and wealth as such are neither ethically neutral nor ordinally invariant.

The Complex Problem of Abortion

The problem of the morality of abortion is one of the most complex and controversial in the entire field of applied ethics. It may therefore appear rather surprising that the most popular proposed

Even If the Fetus is Not a Person, Abortion is Immoral: The Impairment Argument

The premises of this argument are defended against a plethora of objections, concluding that they either do not work, or commit their proponent to a controversial position.

How to Understand a Woman’s Obligations to the Fetus in Unwanted Pregnancies

  • K. Hine
  • Philosophy
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
  • 2013
This paper investigates the plausibility of the moral principle that appears to be driving RO: If a woman is partially morally responsible for the existence of a needy fetus, she has a moral obligation to assist the fetus and argues that this principle is false.