On the mathematics and metaphysics of the hole argument

  title={On the mathematics and metaphysics of the hole argument},
  author={Oliver Pooley and James Read},
  journal={The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
  • O. Pooley, J. Read
  • Published 8 October 2021
  • Physics
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
We make some remarks on the mathematics and metaphysics of the hole argument, in response to a recent article by Weatherall. Broadly speaking, we defend the mainstream philosophical literature from the claim that correct usage of the mathematics of general relativity ‘blocks’ 
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  • J. Weatherall
  • Physics, Mathematics
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2018
I argue that the hole argument is based on a misleading use of the mathematical formalism of general relativity. If one is attentive to mathematical practice, I will argue, the hole argument is
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