On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games

  title={On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games},
  author={Dimitris Fotakis and Alexis C. Kaporis and Thanasis Lianeas and Paul G. Spirakis},
  booktitle={Theor. Comput. Sci.},
In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, a.k.a. Braess's paradox, gives rise to the network design problem, where we seek to recognize routing games suffering from the paradox, and to improve the equilibrium performance by edge removal. In this work, we investigate the computational complexity and the approximability of network design for non-atomic bottleneck routing games, where… 
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Bottleneck Routing Games in Communication Networks
  • Ron BannerA. Orda
  • Computer Science, Economics
    Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2006. 25TH IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications
  • 2006
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