On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in bimatrix game forms

@article{Kukushkin2007OnTG,
  title={On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in bimatrix game forms},
  author={Nikolai S. Kukushkin and Cristian Marius Litan and Francisco Marhuenda},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2007},
  volume={139},
  pages={392-395}
}
We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induces a continuum of outcome distributions. 

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