On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation

@inproceedings{Czumaj2004OnTE,
  title={On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation},
  author={Artur Czumaj and Amir Ronen},
  booktitle={PODC},
  year={2004}
}
We study a generic task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a directed graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. Each edge has an associated cost that is privately known to its owner. Let s and t be two distinguished nodes in G. Given a distribution on the edge costs, the goal is to design a mechanism (protocol) which acquires a cheap s-t path.We first prove that the class of generalized VCG mechanisms has certain monotonicity properties. We exploit this… CONTINUE READING
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Multipart pricing of public goods

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