On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice

@article{Liu2022OnTE,
  title={On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice},
  author={Yun Liu},
  journal={Oper. Res. Lett.},
  year={2022},
  volume={50},
  pages={303-309}
}
  • Yun Liu
  • Published 28 December 2021
  • Economics
  • Oper. Res. Lett.

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