On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox

  title={On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox},
  author={A.M.A. van Deemen},
  journal={Public Choice},
Condorcet’s paradox occurs when there is no alternative that beats every other alternative by majority. The paradox may pose real problems to democratic decision making such as decision deadlocks and democratic paralysis. However, its relevance has been discussed again and again since the celebrated works of Arrow (Social choice and individual values, 1963) and Black (The theory of committees and elections, 1958). The discussion varies from one extreme to the other: from very relevant to… 
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  • A. Karpov
  • Mathematics
    Group Decision and Negotiation
  • 2019
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