On the computational complexity of weighted voting games

@article{Elkind2009OnTC,
  title={On the computational complexity of weighted voting games},
  author={Edith Elkind and Leslie Ann Goldberg and Paul W. Goldberg and Michael Wooldridge},
  journal={Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence},
  year={2009},
  volume={56},
  pages={109-131}
}
Coalitional games provide a useful tool for modeling cooperation in multiagent systems. An important special class of coalitional games is weighted voting games, in which each player has a weight (intuitively corresponding to its contribution), and a coalition is successful if the sum of its members’ weights meets or exceeds a given threshold. A key question in coalitional games is finding coalitions and payoff division schemes that are stable, i.e., no group of players has any rational… CONTINUE READING

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