On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

@article{Barber2004OnTW,
  title={On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union},
  author={Salvador Barber{\`a} and Matthew O. Jackson},
  journal={FEEM Working Paper Series},
  year={2004}
}
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization… Expand
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