On the Value of Correlation

Abstract

Correlated equilibrium [1] generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, in which the agents’ surplus (expected sum of payoffs) is greater than their surplus in all mixedstrategy equilibria. Following the idea initiated by the price of anarchy literature [2, 3… (More)
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2588

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Cite this paper

@article{Ashlagi2005OnTV, title={On the Value of Correlation}, author={Itai Ashlagi and Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz}, journal={J. Artif. Intell. Res.}, year={2005}, volume={33}, pages={575-613} }