On the Shapley-Like Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services with Multiple Content Providers

  title={On the Shapley-Like Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services with Multiple Content Providers},
  author={Jeong-woo Cho and Yung Yi},
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition structure consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content distribution. To distribute the profit from cost reduction to players (i.e., providers and peers), we then establish a… 
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