On the Return to Venture Capital 1

Abstract

We provide a model that links the high return to venture equity to the impatience of the VCs. VCs are scarce, and hence, they have market power and a high return on their investments. As a result, VCs are eager to terminate non-performing ventures so they can move on to new ones. The scarcity of VCs enables them to internalize their social value, and the competitive equilibrium is socially optimal. We estimate the model and back out the return of solo entrepreneurs which is always below that of the return of VCs. 1We thank A. Dittmar, I. Guler, J. Ritter, S. Woodward and Y. Yafeh for data and comments, M.A. Campo-Rembado, W. Fuchs, R. Hall, N. Kyotaki, A. Ljungqvist, C. Michelacci, J. Stein, M. Ueda, L. White and S. Woodward for comments, the NSF for support and A. Gavazza, V. Tsyrennikov, and M. Kredler for ably estimating the model and providing comments on the entire paper. We also thank the NSF and the Kauffman Foundation for support. Appendix B was written by Matthias Kredler. 2New York University and NBER 3University of Chicago

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Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Jovanovic2007OnTR, title={On the Return to Venture Capital 1}, author={Boyan Jovanovic and Bal{\'a}zs Szentes}, year={2007} }