On the Relevance of Theoretical Results to Voting System Choice

  title={On the Relevance of Theoretical Results to Voting System Choice},
  author={Hannu Nurmi},
The first systematic comparisons of voting procedures appeared in the 1970’s. The journal Behavioral Science became a major forum for these early publications. Especially notable are the article by Fishburn (1971) and a series of works by Jeffrey T. Richelson. This series culminated in a summary (Richelson 1979) that is perhaps the most extensive of its kind in terms of both the number of systems and the number of criteria. 
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Elections and Voting Paradoxes.- Condorcet's Paradox.- The Cases of Two and Three Candidates.- The Case of More than Three Candidates.- The Impact of Societal Factors.- The Impact of Coherent