On the Rationale of Group Decision-making

  title={On the Rationale of Group Decision-making},
  author={Duncan Black},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={23 - 34}
  • D. Black
  • Published 1 February 1948
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
When a decision is reached by voting or is arrived at by a group all of whose members are not in complete accord, there is no part of economic theory which applies. This paper is intended to help fill this gap; to provide a type of reasoning which will contribute to the development of the theory of tradeunions, the firm, and the cartel; and to provide the basis for a theory of the equilibrium distribution of taxation or of public expenditure. Still other uses of the theory might be not less… 

Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

The goodness of a collective decision often depends on the wishes of those affected by it. The candidate with a majority is assumed to be best under democracy. Reasonable proposals on how to finance

Games and Political Decisions

This chapter provides an introduction to some fundamental aspects of decision-making in committees. ‘Committee’ is used to refer to a decision-making body that comprises a small number of members (as

Discounting by committee

Dynamic Voting in Clubs

Equilibrium in fiscal choices: Evidence from a budget game

This is an applied study about the stability of collective decision-making in fiscal matters and the features of individual preferences which are sufficient to reach a social ordering. It is based on

An approach to social choice theory

This work is an overview of Social Choice Theory. Social Choice Theory is a theoretical framework to analyse the combination of individual preferences and interests of a collectivity to reach a

Organizational Decision Making Behavior Under Varying Conditions of Uncertainty

The problem of decision making under uncertainty generally has been treated in a rather constrained fashion. Most writers assume that the decision is to be made by an entity the problem of utility

The Two-dimensional Model of Jury Decision Making

This paper discusses a two-dimensional jury model. It combines the idea of winning a maximum of votes in a voting game with utility maximization that derives from the winning proposition. The model

An evolutionary model of voting

Collective allocation of resources that takes place in po- litical markets is characterized by the complex exchange that emerges among the individuals involved. Traditional Public Choice models de-

Strategic Voting

  • R. Meir
  • Economics
    IEEE Intell. Informatics Bull.
  • 2017
The starting point will be the seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which states that under a set of natural requirements, one cannot hope to construct a voting rule that is immune to strategic manipulations by the voters.