On the Rationale of Group Decision-making

  title={On the Rationale of Group Decision-making},
  author={Duncan Black},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={23 - 34}
  • D. Black
  • Published 1 February 1948
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
When a decision is reached by voting or is arrived at by a group all of whose members are not in complete accord, there is no part of economic theory which applies. This paper is intended to help fill this gap; to provide a type of reasoning which will contribute to the development of the theory of tradeunions, the firm, and the cartel; and to provide the basis for a theory of the equilibrium distribution of taxation or of public expenditure. Still other uses of the theory might be not less… 
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    IEEE Intell. Informatics Bull.
  • 2017
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