On the Ramsey Test without Triviality

  title={On the Ramsey Test without Triviality},
  author={Hannes Leitgeb},
  journal={Notre Dame J. Formal Log.},
  • H. Leitgeb
  • Published 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Notre Dame J. Formal Log.
We present a way of classifying the logically possible ways out of Gärdenfors’ inconsistency or triviality result on belief revision with conditionals. For one of these ways—conditionals which are not descriptive but which only have an inferential role as being given by the Ramsey test—we determine which of the assumptions in three different versions of Gärdenfors’ theorem turn out to be false. This is done by constructing ranked models in which such Ramsey-test conditionals are evaluated and… 
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