On the Privacy of Private Browsing - A Forensic Approach

  title={On the Privacy of Private Browsing - A Forensic Approach},
  author={Kiavash Satvat and Matthew Forshaw and Feng Hao and Ehsan Toreini},
Private browsing has been a popular privacy feature built into mainstream browsers since 2005. However, despite the prevalent use, the security of this feature has received little attention from the research community. To the best of our knowledge, no study has existed that systematically evaluates the security of private browsing across major browsers and from multiple angles: not only examining the memory, but also the underlying database structure on the disk and the web traffic. In this… 

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