On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with Fair Cost Allocations

@inproceedings{Fiat2006OnTP,
  title={On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with Fair Cost Allocations},
  author={Amos Fiat and Haim Kaplan and Meital Levy and Svetlana Olonetsky and Ronen Shabo},
  booktitle={ICALP},
  year={2006}
}
In this work we address the open problem of bounding the price of stability for a network design game with fair cost allocations in undirected graphs posed in [ADK+04]. For the version of this problem that we consider, every vertex is associated with a selfish player, and there is a distinguished source vertex to which all players must connect. We show that the price of stability is O(log log n). 

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