• DOI:10.1007/S40732-015-0121-8
• Corpus ID: 145118266

On the Place of Behavior in the Analysis of Psychological Categories

@article{Lazzeri2015OnTP,
  title={On the Place of Behavior in the Analysis of Psychological Categories},
  author={Filipe Lazzeri},
  journal={The Psychological Record},
  year={2015},
  volume={65},
  pages={567-577}
}

• F. Lazzeri
• Published 17 April 2015
• Psychology
• The Psychological Record

The traditional, and still quite accepted, view of psychological phenomena (e.g., emotions, moods, “propositional attitudes”) holds that they are inner entities of some non-behavioral sort (reducible or not to brain phenomena) that bring about behaviors. Behavioral and related externalist perspectives, on the other hand, oppose (in different ways) this view. There is controversy, however, over how to understand psychological phenomena giving prominence to behaviors. Most versions of the so-called extended mind view, for instance, are very different from behavioral perspectives. This paper aims at contributing to this discussion by outlining a behavioral approach that draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others. According to this approach, psychological phenomena of different categories are by and large made up of overt and/or covert behaviors and their relations to the environment. This paper starts off by briefly surveying the range of psychological categories and identifying a desideratum for an account thereof, according to which the account should, in general, be consistent with the basic nuances of these categories. It is suggested that the outlined approach fares well in this respect and is virtuously (as opposed to viciously) parsimonious. Also, Rachlin's teleological behaviorism and Clark and Chalmers' extended mind view are very briefly discussed.