On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries

  title={On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries},
  author={Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)},
  • P. Schmitz
  • Published 1 March 2021
  • Economics
  • PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)
Opportunism and Transaction Costs In Inter-Firm Relationships: Antecedent, Consequence, and Moderator
This study examines the impact of an ex-ante control mechanisms on opportunistic behavior and ex-post transaction costs, as well as how this leads to relationship termination intention. Data gathered


Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information
Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem
This article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship-specific investment and renegotiation. In such a setting, a contract plays an additional role that
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach
The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In
Information Revelation in the Property Right Theory of the Firms
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Our theory of costly contracts emphasizes that contractual rights can be of two types: specific rights and residual rights. When it is costly to list all specific rights over assets in the contract,
A Note on the Property Rights Theory and the Ex Ante Value of Information
This paper examines the ex ante value of information in the property rights model where the possibility exists that an investing agent can be provided with relevant information before investments are
Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm
A seller encountering risk-neutral buyers one at a time should, if commitments are feasible, quote a single take-it-or-leave-it price to each. This strategy is superior to any other for finite or
Competitive contracts with productive information gathering
In this paper, we study competition for procurement contracts with information gathering when there are two potential agents. The agents can acquire information about their private production costs