On the Number of Licenses with Signalling

@article{Antelo2017OnTN,
  title={On the Number of Licenses with Signalling},
  author={Manel Antelo and Antonio Rodr{\'i}guez Sampayo},
  journal={Law & Society: Private Law - Intellectual Property eJournal},
  year={2017}
}
  • Manel Antelo, Antonio Rodríguez Sampayo
  • Published 2017
  • Economics
  • Law & Society: Private Law - Intellectual Property eJournal
  • We analyse a two‐period licensing game in which a non‐producing upstream patent holder licenses an innovation that lasts for two periods to either one or two downstream users. Licensing is made through a payment based on a two‐part tariff, namely a fixed fee plus a royalty per output unit. Regarding the innovation value when commercialized by each user (high or low), we compare a symmetric information context where such value is publicly known with a situation in which users have private… CONTINUE READING
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