On the Number of Licenses with Signalling

  title={On the Number of Licenses with Signalling},
  author={Manel Antelo and Antonio Sampayo},
  journal={ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)},
We analyse a two-period licensing game in which a non-producing upstream patent holder licenses an innovation that lasts for two periods to either one or two downstream users. Licensing is made through a payment based on a two-part tariff, namely a fixed fee plus a royalty per output unit. Regarding the innovation value when commercialized by each user (high or low), we compare a symmetric information context where such value is publicly known with a situation in which users have private… Expand
1 Citations
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