On the Number of Licenses with Signalling

@article{Antelo2017OnTN,
  title={On the Number of Licenses with Signalling},
  author={Manel Antelo and Antonio Sampayo},
  journal={ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)},
  year={2017}
}
  • M. Antelo, A. Sampayo
  • Published 1 December 2017
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • ERPN: Intellectual Property (Topic)
We analyse a two-period licensing game in which a non-producing upstream patent holder licenses an innovation that lasts for two periods to either one or two downstream users. Licensing is made through a payment based on a two-part tariff, namely a fixed fee plus a royalty per output unit. Regarding the innovation value when commercialized by each user (high or low), we compare a symmetric information context where such value is publicly known with a situation in which users have private… 
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ABSTRACT We analyse the impact of licensing on the equilibrium amount of cost-reducing innovation under several licensing mechanisms in the case of a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms. Under a

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