On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games

@article{Wooders2001OnTI,
  title={On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games},
  author={John Wooders and Jason M. Shachat},
  journal={Games Econ. Behav.},
  year={2001},
  volume={34},
  pages={342-363}
}
  • John Wooders, Jason M. Shachat
  • Published 2001
  • Computer Science, Economics
  • Games Econ. Behav.
  • We analyze the equilibria of two-person supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game is strictly competitive and has two outcomes for each player. We show that in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game provided players' preferences over certain outcomes in the supergame satisfy a weak monotonicity condition. Thus, equilibrium play in such supergames is invariant for a large… CONTINUE READING

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