On the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice

@inproceedings{Aziz2014OnTI,
  title={On the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice},
  author={Haris Aziz and Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt},
  booktitle={AAAI},
  year={2014}
}
Efficiency—no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off—and strategyproofness—no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by misrepresenting his preferences—are two cornerstones of economics and ubiquitous in important areas such as voting, auctions, or matching markets. Within the context of random assignment, Bogomolnaia and Moulin have shown that two particular notions of efficiency and strategyproofness based on stochastic dominance are incompatible. However, there… CONTINUE READING
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