On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games

  title={On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games},
  author={Yichen Yang and Kai Jia and Martin C. Rinard},
. We study the impact of player capability on social welfare in congestion games. We introduce a new game, the D istance-bounded N etwork C ongestion game (DNC) , as the basis of our study. DNC is a symmetric network congestion game with a bound on the number of edges each player can use. We show that DNC is PLS -complete in con-trast to standard symmetric network congestion games which are in P . To model different player capabilities, we propose using programs in a Domain-Specific Language (DSL… 

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