On the Empirical Content of Cheap-Talk Signaling : An Application to Bargaining ∗ Matthew

@inproceedings{Tadelis2016OnTE,
  title={On the Empirical Content of Cheap-Talk Signaling : An Application to Bargaining ∗ Matthew},
  author={Steven Tadelis},
  year={2016}
}
We outline an empirical framework to guide the analyses of signaling games and focus on three key features: sorting of senders, incentive compatibility of senders, and belief updating of receivers. We apply the framework to answer the following question: Can sellers credibly signal their private information to reduce frictions in negotiations? We argue that some sellers use round numbers to signal their willingness to cut prices in order to sell faster. Using millions of online bargaining… CONTINUE READING

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 21 references

Market distortions when agents are better informed: The value

  • S. D. Levitt, C. Syverson
  • 2008
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

Cheap talk can matter in bargaining

  • J. Farrell, R. Gibbons
  • Journal of Economic Theory,
  • 1989
Highly Influential
5 Excerpts

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…