On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement

  title={On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement},
  author={Chad P. Bown},
  journal={Review of Economics and Statistics},
  • C. Bown
  • Published 1 August 2004
  • Economics
  • Review of Economics and Statistics
What features of the dispute settlement process help governments live up to their trade liberalization commitments? Exploiting data on GATT/WTO trade disputes initiated and completed between 1973 and 1998, this paper identifies economic and institutional determinants that help defendant governments commit to liberalizing trade. We find substantial evidence consistent with the theory that power measures, including threat of retaliation by the plaintiff, yield credibility to allow defendant… 

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