# On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

@inproceedings{Bousquet2015OnTE,
title={On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction},
author={Nicolas Bousquet and Yang Cai and Christoph Hunkenschr{\"o}der and Adrian Vetta},
booktitle={ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms},
year={2015}
}
• Published in
ACM-SIAM Symposium on…
23 July 2015
• Economics
Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two simultaneous ascending price auctions have proved to be extremely successful. These are the simultaneous multiround ascending auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA). It has long been known that, for certain classes of valuation functions, the SMRA provides good theoretical guarantees on social welfare…
6 Citations
• Economics
WINE
• 2015
It is shown that by bidding securely, it is possible to obtain the same welfare guarantees as truthful bidding without the loss of individual rationality in the SMRA with general valuation functions.
• Economics
EC
• 2018
Under the assumption of truthful bidding, it is proved that the welfare ratio is Θ(m^\frac23)$in the case of unit-demand bidders, and Θ (m)$ for general bidder under the basic price increment rule used in practice.
• Economics
J. Artif. Intell. Res.
• 2017
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which
• Economics
SODA
• 2017
Simple best-response dynamics are studied, showing that convergence is not even necessary for good welfare guarantees, and that if agents have fractionally subadditive valuations, natural dynamics reach and remain in a state that provides a 1/3 approximation to the optimal welfare after each agent has updated his bid at least once.
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which
The notion of a c-compact lattice basis B ∈ Rn×n that facilitates to represent the Voronoi relevant vectors with coefficients bounded by c is introduced, which allows to reduce the space requirement of Micciancio's & Voulgaris’ algorithm for the closest vector problem from exponential to polynomial, while the running time becomes exponential in c.

## References

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It is shown that by bidding securely, it is possible to obtain the same welfare guarantees as truthful bidding without the loss of individual rationality in the SMRA with general valuation functions.
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For many years the Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) has been the primary auction design for spectrum sales worldwide. Recently, the core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) has been
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