On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption

  title={On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption},
  author={Esther Hauk and Maria Saez-Marti},
  journal={Public Economics eJournal},
We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via… 
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