On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games

@inproceedings{Daskalakis2009OnTC,
  title={On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games},
  author={Constantinos Daskalakis and Grant Schoenebeck and Gregory Valiant and Paul Valiant},
  booktitle={SODA},
  year={2009}
}
We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games(AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both ‘local’dependencies as in graphical games, and partial indifference to other agents’ identities as in anonymous games, which occur in many natural settings. This is achieved by specifying a graph on the set of actions, so that the payoff of an agent for selecting a strategy depends only on the number of agents… CONTINUE READING

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