On the Advantage (If Any) and Disadvantage of the Conceptual/Nonconceptual Distinction for Cognitive Science

  title={On the Advantage (If Any) and Disadvantage of the Conceptual/Nonconceptual Distinction for Cognitive Science},
  author={Alessandro Dell'Anna and Marcello Frixione},
  journal={Minds and Machines},
In this article we question the utility of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in cognitive science, and in particular, in the empirical study of visual perception. First, we individuate some difficulties in characterizing the notion of “concept” itself both in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Then we stress the heterogeneous nature of the notion of nonconceptual content and outline the complex and ambiguous relations that exist between the conceptual… 
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