On the (In)security of the Fiat-Shamir paradigm

@article{Goldwasser2003OnT,
  title={On the (In)security of the Fiat-Shamir paradigm},
  author={Shafi Goldwasser and Yael Tauman Kalai},
  journal={44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings.},
  year={2003},
  pages={102-113}
}
  • S. GoldwasserY. Kalai
  • Published 11 October 2003
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2003. Proceedings.
In 1986, Fiat and Shamir proposed a general method for transforming secure 3-round public-coin identification schemes into digital signature schemes. The idea of the transformation was to replace the random message of the verifier in the identification scheme, with the value of some deterministic hash function evaluated on various quantities in the protocol and on the message to be signed. The Fiat-Shamir methodology for producing digital signature schemes quickly gained popularity as it yields… 

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