On strategy-proofness and single peakedness

  title={On strategy-proofness and single peakedness},
  author={Herv{\'e} Moulin},
  journal={Public Choice},
  • H. Moulin
  • Published 1980
  • Economics
  • Public Choice
ConclusionThis paper investigates one of the possible weakening of the (too demanding) assumptions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Namely we deal with a class of voting schemes where at the same time the domain of possible preference preordering of any agent is limited to single-peaked preferences, and the message that this agent sends to the central authority is simply its ‘peak’ — his best preferred alternative. In this context we have shown that strategic considerations justify the… 
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
Although peaks-onliness cannot be replaced by the "weaker" property of continuity in the first result -as is the case in Ching (1997)- this equivalence is achieved when voter- sovereignty is also required and strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty characterize the class of efficient generalized median solutions.
A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
It is shown that the “separable domain” is the unique maximal domain over which each rule in the first characterization, satisfying a certain fairness property, is strategy-proof and that serially dictatorial rules are the only voting rules satisfying efficiency as well as the above two axioms.
Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in a Mixed-Good Economy with Single-Peaked Preferences
We conduct an analysis of the implications of strategy-proofness and efficiency in a model of a mixed-good economy. Following Corte-Real (2001), we decompose the mixed good into two components - a
Strategy-proofness and Single-crossing I Am Grateful to Two Anonymous Referees and the Coeditor, Martin Osborne, for Helpful Comments and Corrections on an Earlier Draft. I Also Thank
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is
Strategy-proofness and “median voters”
We consider the problem of choosing a level of the public good for an economy in which agents have continuous and single-peaked preferences (Black, 1948). We show that a solution satisfying
Truthful Mechanism Design without Money : No Upward Bidding
Gibbard-Satterthwaite (G-S) theorem rules out the existence of any truthful, non-dictatorial and unanimous social choice function whose range comprises three or more alternatives. To circumvent the
Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
Deterministic and anonymous strategy-proof and group strategy-Proof mechanisms on single-dipped public policy domain are characterized and the tradeoff between strategy- proofness and efficiency is considered by applying the characterization.
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
It is proved that, in a certain class of voting systems based on pairwise comparisons of alternatives, the RCVS is the only one to be Condorcet-proof, and two theorems about group-strategy-proofness are proved.
Paper Series EDP-0617 Strategic voting on single crossing domains
This paper analyzes collective choices in a society with strategic voters and single-crossing preferences. It shows that, in addition to single-peakedness, single-crossingness is another meaningful


Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
It has been conjectured that no system of voting can preclude strategic voting-the securing by a voter of an outcome he prefers through misrepresentation of his preferences. In this paper, for all
Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
A GAME FORM IS ANY SYSTEM which makes an outcome depend on individual actions of some kind, called strategies. Prime examples are systems of voting. Where voting consists of each person's marking a
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
  • D. Black
  • Economics
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1948
When a decision is reached by voting or is arrived at by a group all of whose members are not in complete accord, there is no part of economic theory which applies. This paper is intended to help
The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority
The limits of the size of majority. Frequently it is provided by the rules of a society that any amendment to the rules must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members voting; or the majority
Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
The Theory Of Social Choice