On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts

@article{Hirata2016OnSA,
  title={On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts},
  author={Daisuke Hirata and Yusuke Kasuya},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2016},
  volume={168},
  pages={27-43}
}
This paper studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. Not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of aggregate demand, we obtain the following results. First, the number of stable and strategy-proof rules is at most one. Second, the doctor-optimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is the unique candidate for a stable and strategy-proof rule. Third, a stable and strategy-proof rule, whenever it exists, is second-best optimal… CONTINUE READING
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