On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories

  title={On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories},
  author={Filipe Lazzeri},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={405 - 418}
  • F. Lazzeri
  • Published 22 February 2016
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Philosophical Psychology
Abstract This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis’ “perfect actor” case and Kirk’s “zombie”; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena… 
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