On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument

@article{Baker2004OnMW,
  title={On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument},
  author={Gordon Pratt Baker and Peter M. S. Hacker},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2004},
  volume={58},
  pages={407-450}
}

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