On hotelling's "Stability in competition"

  title={On hotelling's "Stability in competition"},
  author={Claude d'Aspremont and Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse},
The purpose of this note is to show that the so-called Principle of Minimum Differentiation, as based on Hotelling’s 1929 paper “Stability in Competition” is invalid. The purpose of this note is to show that the so-called Principle of Minimum Differentiation, as based on Hotelling’s 1929 celebrated paper (Hotelling [3]), is invalid. Firstly, we assert that, contrary to the statement formulated by Hotelling in his model, nothing can be said about the tendency of both sellers to agglomerate at… 
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