On economic applications of evolutionary game theory

  title={On economic applications of evolutionary game theory},
  author={Daniel Friedman},
  journal={Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
  • D. Friedman
  • Published 26 March 1998
  • Economics
  • Journal of Evolutionary Economics
Abstract. Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models. 
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