On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries
@article{Garratt1997OnAM,
title={On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries},
author={R. Garratt and Cheng-Zhong Qin},
journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
year={1997},
volume={77},
pages={81-101}
}Abstract Given a game, the set of joint lotteries over partitions of the agents of any subgame induces a subset of the vectors of balancing weights for the subgame. Games whose subgames are all balanced with respect to these vectors of balancing weights are called totally L-balanced games. We show that such games are precisely the ones that can be generated from direct lottery markets. Total L-balancedness is equivalent to superadditivity. Thus, many interesting games that are not totally… CONTINUE READING
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