On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries

  title={On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries},
  author={R. Garratt and Cheng-Zhong Qin},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  • R. Garratt, Cheng-Zhong Qin
  • Published 1997
  • Economics
  • Journal of Economic Theory
  • Abstract Given a game, the set of joint lotteries over partitions of the agents of any subgame induces a subset of the vectors of balancing weights for the subgame. Games whose subgames are all balanced with respect to these vectors of balancing weights are called totally L-balanced games. We show that such games are precisely the ones that can be generated from direct lottery markets. Total L-balancedness is equivalent to superadditivity. Thus, many interesting games that are not totally… CONTINUE READING
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