On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory

  title={On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory},
  author={Robert Axelrod},
  journal={Analyse \& Kritik},
  pages={130 - 151}
Abstract The symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik extends the basis of Cooperation Theory as set forth in Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation (1984). This essay begins with an overview of Cooperation Theory in terms of the questions it asks, its relationship to game theory and rationality, and the principal methodologies used, namely deduction and simulation. This essay then addresses the issues raised in the symposium, including the consequences of extending the original… 
The shadow of the past: how experience affects behavior in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma experiment
We study the development of cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment with teams as players, unknown length and unknown continuation probability as it could happen between traders
Heterogeneous Strategy Learning in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
This paper proposes an agent-based model that takes into account heterogeneity among individuals’ learning strategies and is an adaptation of the so-called consumat approach, originally developed by Wander Jager and Marco Janssen in order to integrate different models of individuals behavior.
An Experimental Comparison of Negotiation Strategies for Siting NIMBY Facilities
The quality of the urban living environment is strongly related to the provision and planning or design of public facilities, of which NIMBY, not-in-my-back-yard, facilities are often resisted by
The dynamics of alliances. A game theoretical approach
In this dissertation, Annelies de Ridder presents a game theoretical approach to strategic alliances. More specifically, the dynamics of and within alliances have been studied. To do so, four new
Emerging Cooperation in the Spatial IPD with Reinforcement Learning and Coalitions
Game theory provides useful mathematical tools to understand the possible strategies that self-interested agents may follow when choosing an action and the role of local interactions in the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems
Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School’s important contributions include the development of the concept of “polycentric” political systems and the demonstration that solutions to common-pool
Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School‘s important contributions include the development of the concept of ―polycentric‖ political systems and the demonstration that solutions to common-pool
Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option.


The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
  • R. Axelrod
  • Economics
    American Political Science Review
  • 1981
This article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority. This problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political
The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation
Results of agent-based simulation experiments in which the basic activity of the agents is to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma are reported, which support a generalized view of "neighborhood" where the important factor is the degree to which the interaction processes lead to context preservation, independent of any particular topology.
Exit Threats and Cooperation under Anonymity
It turns out that egoistical cooperation is much more robust than realized by most game-theoretical and sociological analyses.
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners: Evolutionary Results
An overview of the previous evolutionary results is provided, and some preliminary results on the impact of increasing the population size and including more randomness into the partner selection procedure are included.
The Strategy of Conflict.
I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An Essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War II. A Reorientation of Game Theory 4.
The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
Is cooperation without central authority stable? If so, how robust is it? Despite what might be the conventional wisdom, The Evolution of Cooperation did not solve this problem deductively. In fact,
The Further Evolution of Cooperation
Empirical andoretical work has led to a deeper understanding of the role of other factors in the evolution of cooperation: the number of players, the range of possible choices, variation in the payoff structure, noise, the shadow of the future, population dynamics, and population structure.
Exit, Anonymity and the Chances of Egoistical Cooperation
The results of computer simulations with a community of actors playing a large number of voluntarily iterated two-person-PD are presented, and a class of seemingly clever strategies is introduced which try to exploit the expected dynamics of looking for a partner.
The Logic of Contrition
A highly successful strategy for the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is Contrite Tit For Tat, which bases its decisions on the ‘‘standings’’ of the two players. This strategy is as good as Tit For Tat at