On Representational Redundancy, Surplus Structure, and the Hole Argument

@article{Bradley2019OnRR,
  title={On Representational Redundancy, Surplus Structure, and the Hole Argument},
  author={Clara Bradley and James Owen Weatherall},
  journal={Foundations of Physics},
  year={2019},
  volume={50},
  pages={270-293}
}
  • Clara Bradley, James Owen Weatherall
  • Published 2019
  • Physics
  • Foundations of Physics
  • We address a recent proposal concerning ‘surplus structure’ due to Nguyen et al. (Br J Phi Sci, 2018). We argue that the sense of ‘surplus structure’ captured by their formal criterion is importantly different from—and in a sense, opposite to—another sense of ‘surplus structure’ used by philosophers. We argue that minimizing structure in one sense is generally incompatible with minimizing structure in the other sense. We then show how these distinctions bear on Nguyen et al.’s arguments about… CONTINUE READING

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