On Repeated Games with Complete Information

@article{Sorin1986OnRG,
  title={On Repeated Games with Complete Information},
  author={Sylvain Sorin},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
  year={1986},
  volume={11},
  pages={147-160}
}
  • S. Sorin
  • Published 1 February 1986
  • Economics
  • Math. Oper. Res.
We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several properties of the sets of feasible payoffs and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the λ-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical value of the discount factor. 

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