• Corpus ID: 17525165

On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and the Others on Reading Signs on Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and the Others

  title={On Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and the Others on Reading Signs on Reading Signs; Some Differences between Us and the Others},
  author={Ruth Garrett Millikan},
If there are certain kinds of signs that an animal cannot learn to interpret, that might be for any of a number of reasons. It might be, first, because the animal cannot discriminate the signs from one another. For example, although human babies learn to discriminate human speech sounds according to the phonological structures of their native languages very easily, it may be that few if any other animals are capable of fully grasping the phonological structures of human languages. If an animal… 
Temporal Structure in Emerging Language: From Natural Data to Silent Gesture.
This paper investigates how people convey temporal information when they cannot use any conventional languages they know, and confirms that presenting temporal information separately and initially is a robust strategy to talk about past and future when only sparse communicative means are available.
Semantic structures, communicative strategies and the emergence of language
This thesis showed that gesture sequences in the improvised communication experiment are governed by semantic principles which are essentially the same as those governing restricted linguistic systems: this can be used as a source of evidence for semantic principles in evolutionarily early language, and revealed a new semantic ordering principle governing the expression of intensional meaning.
Origins of Meaning: Must We 'Go Gricean'?
It is argued that, while it may be true that nonhuman animals, in contrast to language users, lack the 'motive to share information' understood ` al aGrice, non human animals nevertheless do express states of mind through complex nonlinguistic behavior.
Deception and Formal Models of Communication
The proposed definition of behavioral deception is applied to chick begging in the Sir Philip Sidney game and stomatopod bluffing behavior and is shown to allow universal deception in equilibrium, contrary to claims by Kant that such a thing should be impossible.
Behavioural Deception and Formal Models of Communication
A new definition of behavioural deception is offered, like some other proposed attempts, it relies on formal game-theoretic models of signalling and incorporates explicit consideration of the population in which the potentially deceptive interactions occur.
On Biological and Verbal Camouflage: The Strategic Use of Models in Non-Scientific Thinking
By analyzing the inferential operations underpinning camouflage-breaking strategies, this chapter will try to explain how the same tacit use of models representing the other’s cognitive abilities is at play in human communication, when enacting and uncovering linguistic deception.
Monsters on the Brain: An Evolutionary Epistemology of Horror
Fear of the dark (nyctophobia), spiders (arachnophobia), and snakes (herpetophobia) are universal terrors among human beings, whereas zombies, vampires, and psychopaths are more culturally specific.
Gatherings in biosemiotics
The work collected in Gatherings in Biosemiotics presents the current spectrum of thought on semiotic biology in one congregate volume. The contributions are divided into three parts. The first part
The cognitive cell: bacterial behavior reconsidered
  • P. Lyon
  • Biology
    Front. Microbiol.
  • 2015
Evidence in bacteria for capacities encompassed by the concept of cognition is reviewed, and parallels exist not only at the heuristic level of functional analogue, but also at the level of molecular mechanism, evolution and ecology, which is where fruitful cross-fertilization among disciplines might be found.
From quorum to cooperation: lessons from bacterial sociality for evolutionary theory.
  • P. Lyon
  • Biology
    Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences
  • 2007


On Explaining Behavior
It is argued that Dretske's theory experiences similar difficulties even when the theory is applied to natural systems (e.g., humans), and that the work with learning mobile robots demonstrates that the distinction between learned and designed states is not always well-defined.
Do insects have cognitive maps?
A cognitive map is the mental analogue of a topographic map, i.e. an internal representation of the geometric relations among noticeable points in the animal's environment so that an animal using such a map must be able to compute the shortest distance between two charted points without ever having traveled along that route.
Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches.
  • J. Norman
  • Psychology, Biology
    The Behavioral and brain sciences
  • 2002
A dual-process approach to visual perception emerges, with the ecological-dorsal process transpiring mainly without conscious awareness, while the constructivist-ventral process is normally conscious.
Origins of the modern mind
In Origins of the Modern Mind, Merlin Donald has offered a provocative, compelling, and radically different view of cognition. It was a great pleasure to follow his convincing arguments on the
Ethology: The Mechanisms and Evolution of Behavior
This book develops this theme by looking first at traditional ethology to establish familiarity with the models which will be used to examine neural mechanisms, social behavior and species interactions, and finally the authors' own species.
The Honey Bee
THE interior economy of the hive is known intimately to every bee-keeper; with the anatomy of its makers, rulers, citizens, not one in a hundred is familiar. The mass of facts accumulated during two
Spatial memory and navigation by honeybees on the scale of the foraging range
  • Dyer
  • Psychology
    The Journal of experimental biology
  • 1996
This paper reviews recent progress towards understanding three specific aspects of how bees learn the spatial relationships among widely separated locations in a familiar terrain and whether, and if so how, Bees learn the relationships between celestial cues and landmarks.
Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view
In the fall semester of 1772/73 at the Albertus University of Konigsberg, Immanuel Kant, metaphysician and professor of logic and metaphysics, began lectures on anthropology, which he continued until
Insect navigation: use of maps or Ariadne's thread ?
This chapter discusses how an animal using the mental analogue of a topographical map can episodically take a positional fix, i.e. rely on information collected on site.
The Locale Map of Honey Bees: Do Insects Have Cognitive Maps?
Experiments with honey bees show that these insects have and use landmark maps thus invalidating this presumed invertebrate-vertebrate dichotomy.