On Quantifying Into Epistemic Contexts

  title={On Quantifying Into Epistemic Contexts},
  author={R. Sleigh},
According to Quine and Hintikka (1) is sometimes used in such a way that in conjunction with (2) it implies (8). (1) is used on other occasions in such a way that this implication fails.' Let us say, following Quine, that 'knows' occurs transparently in (1) when such implication holds and opaquely when it fails.2 One thesis central to Quine's discussion of verbs of propositional attitude is that only when (1) is taken transparently may 'Cicero' be replaced by a variable which, in turn, is bound… Expand
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