On Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games

@article{Krieger2003OnPE,
  title={On Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games},
  author={Thomas Krieger},
  journal={Math. Meth. of OR},
  year={2003},
  volume={58},
  pages={449-458}
}
In this paper we investigate the existence of Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games. In particular we show that every vectorvalued extensive form game with perfect information has at least one subgame perfect Pareto equilibrium in pure strategies. If one tries to prove this and develop a vector-valued backward induction procedure in analogy to the real-valued one, one sees that different effects may occur which thus have to be taken into account: First, suppose the deciding… CONTINUE READING

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