On Optimal Single-Item Auctions


We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently distributed. We focus on general joint distributions, seeking the optimal deterministic incentive compatible auction. We give a geometric characterization of the optimal auction… (More)
DOI: 10.1145/1993636.1993654


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@inproceedings{Papadimitriou2011OnOS, title={On Optimal Single-Item Auctions}, author={Christos H. Papadimitriou and George Pierrakos}, booktitle={STOC}, year={2011} }