On Market Clearing of Day Ahead Auctions for European Power Markets: Cost Minimisation versus Social Welfare Maximisation

@article{Puiu2022OnMC,
  title={On Market Clearing of Day Ahead Auctions for European Power Markets: Cost Minimisation versus Social Welfare Maximisation},
  author={Ioan Alexandru Puiu and Raphael Andreas Hauser},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2022},
  volume={abs/2207.06396}
}
For the case of inflexible demand and considering network constraints, we introduce a Cost Minimisation (CM) based market clearing mechanism, and a model representing the standard Social Welfare Maximisation mechanism used in European Day Ahead Electricity Markets. Since the CM model corresponds to a more challenging optimisation problem, we propose four numerical algorithms that leverage the problem structure, each with di ff erent trade-o ff s between computational cost and convergence… 

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