On Improving Resource Allocations by Sharing

  title={On Improving Resource Allocations by Sharing},
  author={Robert Bredereck and Andrzej Kaczmarczyk and Junjie Luo and Rolf Niedermeier and Florian Sachse},
  booktitle={AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a sharing concept allowing resources being shared with social network neighbors of the resource owners. To this end, we introduce a formal model that allows a central authority to compute an optimal sharing between neighbors based on an initial allocation… 

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